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WHITE SLAVES: IRISH REBEL PRISONERS AND THE BRITISH 




The significant role played by Irishmen in the military and naval campaigns of the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has not gone unnoticed.
1 As many as 
150,000 may have been recruited by the Army in this  era.  Tapping the mainly 
Catholic manpower oflreland was a complex political issue in the 1790s, requiring 
among both government ministers and military staff confidence in the ordinary 
Irishman's ultimate allegiance to the Crown, which in the event was usually justi-
fied.2  Despite this Irish presence, however, recruiting sufficient numbers for the 
Army remained a persistent problem, not least because of low pay, poor service 
conditions and harsh discipline. Moreover, most line regiments could expect at one 
time or another to serve in the West Indies, where during the Revolutionary Wars 
virulent epidemic diseases turned the islands into charnel houses for unseasoned 
white troops.
3  Between 1793 and 1801 more than 45,000 British soldiers died in 
the Caribbean, a mortality rate of about fifty per cent.
4 
The West Indian theatre was thus a heavy drain on a scarce resource and the 
government  sought  to  alleviate  the  problem by resorting  to  three  strategems: 
recruiting foreign auxiliary formations;
5 embodying regiments ofblacks;
6 and filling 
up regular regiments in the West Indies with conditionally-pardoned criminals and 
deserters. Although recruiting convicted prisoners in small numbers from the gaols 
had a long pedigree by the 1790s, and is well documented/ the government's resort 
to this measure in the years after 1798 has not yet been fully explored. In particular, 
the drafting oflarge numbers oflrish rebel prisoners into the Army has gone almost 
1 D. A. Chart, 'The Irish Levies during the Great French War', English Historical Review 32 (1917), 
497-516; Thomas Bartlett, 'Defence, counter-insurgency and rebellion:  Ireland,  1793-1803', in A 
Military History of  Ireland, eds Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 247-93. 
2 R.  B.  McDowell, Ireland in  the  Age of Imperialism  and Revolution  1760-1801  (Oxford,  1979), 
p. 568. 
3 Between 1793 and 1801 sixty-nine line regiments were sent to the West Indies. Rene Chartrand 
and Paul Chappell, British Forces in the  West Indies 1793-1815 (London, 1996), p. 3. 
4 Michael Duffy, Soldiers,  Sugar and Seapower.  The  British  Expeditions  to  the  West Indies  and the 
War against Revolutionary France (Oxford, 1987), p. 333. 
5 C. T. Atkinson, 'The Foreign Element in the British Army, 1793-1815', Journal of the  Royal 
United  Service  Institution  58  (1914), 289-320.  Perhaps significantly, there were difficulties  raising 
German troops for the West Indies in the late 1790s. See William Huskisson to George Hammond, 
11 Jan. 1798, Public Record Office [PRO], FO 33/14, fol.  15; Henry Dundas to Lt-Gen. Bowyer, 23 
Mar. 1799, PRO WO 1/87, pp. 65-9. 
6 Roger N. Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats:  The Bzitish West India Regiments 1795-1815 (New Haven, 
1979). 
7 J.  M. Beattie, Crime  and the  Courts  in  England 1660-1800 (Princeton, 1986), pp. 498, 532-3; 
Stephen R.  Conway, 'The Recruitment of Criminals into the British Army, 177  5-81 ', Bulletin of the 
Institute of  Historical Research 58 (1985), 46-58  .. 
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unremarked. 
8  The most recent study of the British Army in the West Indies, for 
instance, fails to appreciate that most of the 'culprits' dispatched to the Caribbean 
were not Englishmen awaiting trial on common law charges but Irishmen guilty of 
political offences.
9 The purpose of  this article, therefore, is to bring this obscure but 
important Irish dimension to light by examining the fate of several thousand Irish 
rebel prisoners who were drafted into the so-called 'condemned regiments' in the 
West Indies  following  the  collapse  of the Rebellion  of 1798.
10  Together,  they 
formed  the largest forcible  transportation of recalcitrant Irishmen to the West 
Indies since the mid-seventeenth century. 
II 
The  Irish  government's  policy  from  July  1798  of condemning  selected  rebel 
prisoners to general service overseas may be viewed as an attempt to kill two birds 
with one stone, for in theory it would not only alleviate the Army's manpower 
difficulties, but also solve the intractable problem of what to do with thousands of 
disaffected Irish rebel prisoners. Coping with an increasing number of politically-
motivated prisoners was  an issue which had existed even before the Rebellion. 
From 1795, as both the United Irish and Defender movements spread in increas-
ingly militarised form through much of Ireland, the government found itself with 
hundreds of unruly prisoners on its hands. Initially, the quick-fix solution, as pro-
moted by Lord Carhampton in Connacht, was to force the disaffected into the 
Navy, an illegal practice which subsequently required indemnifying legislation. In 
1796, alarmed by the spread of arms raids and by growing evidence of an alliance 
between the Defenders and the United Irishmen, the government passed the first 
version of an Insurrection Act (36 Geo. III, c.20), which, in addition to making the 
administering of an illegal oath a capital offence and the taking of such an oath 
punishable by transportation to New South Wales, gave increased powers to local 
magistrates acting in proclaimed districts. Those who broke curfew or who were 
deemed 'disorderly' by two magistrates could, subject to appeal at the next quarter 
sessions, be drafted into the Navy.
11 
How many Irishmen were forced into the Navy by these methods remains 
unclear, but the mutinies at the Nore and Spithead in 1797, in which Irishmen 
were prominent, forced a reconsideration of  the policy, with the Army being seen as 
8 This is not altogether surprising, as most of the returns relating to the Irish prisoners no longer 
exist.  They were destroyed during the fire  which swept the Four Courts in Dublin during the civil 
war in 1922. 
9 Roger N. Buckley, The British Anny in the  West Indies.  Society and the  Milita~y in the Revolution-
ary Age (Gainesville, 1998), esp. pp. 95-7. 
10 The Irish rebels were drafted into regular line regiments in the West Indies, but contemporary 
commentators, aware that service in the West Indies was tantamount to a death warrant, tended to 
speak of 'condemned regiments', as if they were penal units. See, for example, Dublin Evening Post, 3 
July 1798. 
11 For Lord Kilwarden's learned comments on this Act and its subsequent versions, see William 
Wickham Papers (copies from Hampshire Record Office), Public Record Office of Northern Ireland 
[PRONI], T  2627/5/W/5. 1 
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a suitable alternative by some in Ireland. 
12 At the Home Office in London, how-
ever, the Duke of Portland strongly opposed both solutions: 'If any such measure 
(and it may possibly be a very expedient and necessary one) is in contemplation, I 
must beg to suggest to you transportation to New South Wales or such place as His 
Majesty shall think fit to appoint in lieu of the intended punishment.'
13 Unfortun-
ately, owing to inefficiency in his own office, Portland's strictures came too late; the 
Irish Parliament had already passed an amended insurrection bill, giving magis-
trates  the power to  draft the 'disorderly'  into the Army as  well  as  the Navy,'4 
Nevertheless, Portland urged Lord Lieutenant Camden to introduce another bill to 
enable the authorities to send the disaffected to Botany Bay.
15 
Transportation to New South Wales was, however, impractical in the period 
before the Rebellion and, indeed, for  a  considerable time thereafter.  There was 
already a  bottleneck in the transportation system,  caused by the government's 
inability to find vessels suitable for the long voyage. Several hundred criminals sen-
tenced to transportation were already filling the prisons. At the same time, counter-
insurgency laws, including the suspension of habeas corpus, were placing increasing 
pressure on the gaol network. For instance, no fewer than 332 prisoners were tried 
for administering or taking illegal oaths in the two assizes of 1797 and the Lent 
assizes of 1798.
16 The mass arrests of suspects prior to the Rebellion, creating large 
groups of 'state prisoners' in Dublin, Belfast and Cork, placed further pressure on 
limited gaol space. Thus, even before vast numbers of defeated rebels fell into the 
government's hands from May 1798, the gaols were bursting at the seams. 
When the new Lord Lieutenant, Marquess Cornwallis, arrived in Dublin in 
June 1798, he found that floating tenders, military prisons and public buildings 
were needed to house the overflow of  prisoners. And the numbers kept increasing. 
Apart from quelling the last remnants of  rebellion, including the French invasion in 
September, and overseeing the move to legislative union with Britain, much of 
Cornwallis' viceregal time until his resignation in 1801 was spent dealing with the 
problem of rebel prisoners.
17 Anxious to dampen down the sectarian fears caused 
by the Rebellion, he swiftly devised a policy which promised security to the rebels 
still in arms if  they voluntarily surrendered. Together with his chief secretary, Lord 
12  See,  e.g.  Col.  Charles  Tarrant  (Duncannon  Fort)  to -, 5  June  1797,  National Archives, 
Ireland [NAI], Rebellion Papers [RP]  620/31/37. Naval hostility to the practice of inducting rebels 
into the Navy remained strong. See Huskisson to Nepean, 4 Jan.  1799, PRO, WO 6/148, p.  158; 
William Marsden to Huskisson, 7 Jan.  1799, PRO, WO 1/693, fol.  7.  Nevertheless rebels, in small 
numbers, continued to be drafted into the Navy, even after the renewal of war in 1803. See Names 
of State Prisoners in Kilmainham and Newgate ordered to enlist, 1804, NAI, RP 620/13/173/1 and 
3. 
13 Portland to Camden, 27 Mar. 1798, PRO, HO 100/75, fol. 326. 
14 Camden to Portland, 31 Mar. 1798, PRO, HO 100/75, fol. 364. 
15 Portland to Camden, 11  May 1798, PRO, HO 109/80, fols 279-80. 
16 These are figures based on my own calculations from the data in various Irish newspapers and 
the journals of the Irish House of Commons. 
17 Castlereagh claimed during the parliamentary debate on the renewal of the Martial Law Act in 
Mar. 1800 that Cornwallis 'spent five hours a day examining each case and sentence'. Dublin Evening 
Press,  13 Mar. 1800. 
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Castlereagh,  Cornwallis promoted a  strategy targeting rebel leaders rather than 
ordinary pikemen. On surrendering their weapons and taking the oath of alleg-
iance, rank and file rebels not involved in murders or robberies would be permitted 
to return quietly to their homes. Only those who had held the rank of captain or 
above in the rebel forces before 9r during the Rebellion, or who had committed 
major crimes, would face prosecution. 
18 
Although this  policy was  undoubtedly a  success,
19  it still  left thousands of 
prisoners to be dealt with, men who had already been sentenced (mainly by courts 
martial), or who had yet to be tried, or who were in custody under the Insurrection 
Act. In dealing with these, Cornwallis had to walk a narrow path between, on the 
one side, enraged ultra-loyalists who were baying for revenge and blood, and on the 
other, barely-cowed rebels who might renew their insurrection if  they felt that they 
had nothing to lose.
20 Personally, both Cornwallis and Castlereagh favoured a long-
term policy of 'qualified leniency',  involving the commutation of many capital 
verdicts to sentences-induction into the Army and transportation-which inevit-
ably led to further clogging of the gaols. Between July 1798 and the spring of 1801 
Cornwallis commuted nearly one-third of the capital sentences passed both by 
courts martial and civil  courts for  offences  during the Rebellion.  Although the 
balance was partly redressed by increasing the numbers of those released on security 
by two-thirds  during the  same period, the fact  remained that in the  eighteen 
months after the outbreak of rebellion the government had on its hands several 
thousand young and mostly able-bodied rebels whose release back into Irish society 
was too risky to contemplate. 
Several possible solutions to the prisoner problem were offered during this 
period. Lord Lieutenant Camden, even before the Rebellion, had suggested draft-
ing rebels into the forces of the East India Company, but his letter of enquiry to 
Henry Dundas, President of the East India Company Board of Control, seems not 
to have elicited a reply.
21 John King, Under-Secretary at the Home Office, thought 
that the risk posed by the rebel prisoners would be lessened if they were sent to 
those parts 'of our North American colonies [New Brunswick or Upper Canada] 
which  are not frontier Provinces  in respect of our Enemy'. 
22  Captain Philippe 
d'  Auvergne, Britain's spy controller on Jersey, noted, redundantly, that 'Our aver-
sion to Blood, or putting to Death a great number of people indiscriminately after 
they have surrendered themselves Prisoners, leaves Government in a very embar-
18 Cornwallis to Portland, 8 July 1798, PRO, HO 100177, fol.  216. 
19 William Elliot to Lord Pelham, 28 July 1798, Pelham Papers, British Library [BL], Add. MS. 
33106, fol.  27. 
2°  Craufurd to  Wickham,  25  July  1798, Wickham Papers,  Hampshire Record  Office  [HRO], 
38M49/8/14/5; Henry Alexander to Pelham, 26 July 1798, BL, Add. MS. 33106, fols  21-4; Corn-
wallis  to Portland, 8 July 1798, PRO, HO 100177, fol.  217. For a more detailed consideration of 
Cornwallis' policy see Michael Durey, 'Marquess Cornwallis and the Fate of Irish Rebel Prisoners in 
the aftermath of the 1798 Rebellion', in The  Irish  Rebellion  of 1798,  ed. James Smyth (Cambridge, 
2000). 
21  Camden to Portland, 7 May 1798, PRO, HO 100/80, fol.  263. 
22 John King to William Huskisson, 13 Nov. 1799, PRO, HO 30/2, fols 372-3. 300  ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
rassed Situation.' Yet 'the [Irish] man that is pardoned today will cut your Throat 
tomorrow'. Basing his proposal on the need for self-preservation and on the old 
Dutch proverb, 'Gentle Surgeons make stinking Sores', d'Auvergne suggested that 
the government should seek the Russian emperor's permission to send the Irish 
prisoners to Siberia as serfs. 'Twenty or thirty thousand of them dispersed over that 
Country', he concluded, 'would not endanger the safety of it, and they would be 
soon sunk into the Body of  the People.
023 
D'  Auvergne's letter passed through the hands of Dundas, Portland and his 
Under-Secretary William Wickham before being quietly filed  and forgotten, for 
already a  somewhat similar scheme was  underway.  Early in 1799 the Prussian 
charge d'affaires in London had offered to draft the most suitable rebel prisoners 
into the Prussian Army. Cornwallis gave his approval, as did the King and Port-
land, who were anxious to draw Prussia into the second coalition against revo-
lutionary France. A limit of 500 recruits was determined, all of whom, in theory if 
not in practice, had to be volunteers. The choice was to be made from those already 
sentenced to transportation or from those sentenced under the Insurrection Act. A 
Prussian recruiting officer, Captain Schouler, made his selection from the holding 
depots,  seeking  physical  standards  so  high  that  in  the  event  only  about  350 
prisoners were sent to Emden.
24 
Any thoughts  of repeating this  exercise  were  discarded when the Prussians 
remained obstinately neutral during the campaigns of 1799, thus leaving, once again, 
only transportation or the British Army as practical solutions to the question of the 
rebel prisoners. The sheer scale of the issue ensured that transportation would act 
only as  a partial vent; probably no more than 400 political prisoners were sent to 
Botany Bay between 1799 and 1806.
25 Nor were technical problems the only reasons 
why transportation remained a secondary solution, for Cornwallis personally believed 
that, for most prisoners, transportation was too harsh a penalty. He viewed Botany 
Bay as  a dumping ground for felons, not for rebels, unless they were also guilty of 
serious  felonies. 
26  The Army,  on the other hand, was  an honourable profession, 
through which rebels could expiate their guilt and demonstrate their loyalty to the 
crown. Cornwallis' attitude, the consequence of a long career in the Army, goes some 
way towards explaining why in July 1798 the district commanders in Ireland were 
told that 'Prisoners concerned in the present Conspiracy and Rebellion, who have 
not been leaders therein, and may be anxious to atone for their past crimes ... 
should be permitted to enlist in His Majesty's service, in order that they may be 
offered to such Regiments as it may be most expedient to assign them to. '
27 
23  Capt. d'Auvergne to Henry Dundas, 23 Apr. 1799, PRO, HO 30/2, fols 291-5. 
24 Michael Durey, 'The Fate ofthe Rebels after 1798', History Today 48 (1998), 21-7. 
25 This figure is  derived from my own data collected from the rebellion papers, Irish newspapers 
and a wide range of other sources, which have been compared with the indents of the ships taking 
Irish prisoners to New South Wales in these years. 
26 Cornwallis to Portland, 29 Oct. 1798, PRO, HO 100/82, fol.  231; [Littlehales] to Johnson, 24 
Jan. 1799, PRO, HO 100/86, fol.  117. 
27 Adjutant-General Hewitt to Gen. Nugent, 20 July 1798, Nugent Papers, National Army Museum 
[NAM], 6807/174, pp. 489-90. 
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As this order suggests, Cornwallis was not na'ive; he had no intention of allow-
ing rebel volunteers a  choice of regiment. The plan was to draft the rebels into 
regiments which were already under orders to go  abroad (on 'general service'). 
Regular regiments based in Britain with recruiting parties in Ireland, or British 
fencible units currently in the co-yntry, were strictly forbidden to raise troops from 
among the rebels in custody.
28 
Cornwallis was by no means unaware of the risks involved in drafting so many 
rebels into the Army, but in the eighteen months following the Rebellion he was 
more concerned with ridding the country of this mass of disaffection as  swiftly as 
possible than with the short-term interests of the Army. The phrase he frequently 
used when he commuted court martial sentences was  'transportation or general 
service' .
29 Under this rubric, all prisoners could expect to be drafted into the Army 
unless physically unfit. In the months up to January 1799, most of those found 
physically fit were drafted into three units, the 30th and 89th Regiments and the 
Prince of  Wales's Fencibles, all of  which were preparing for overseas service in the 
Mediterranean.  There they were  joined by an unfathomable number of other 
rebels, many of  whom, already in custody, were offered the choice of 'volunteering' 
for the Army or a court martial. 
30 Others volunteered before arrest to escape trial for 
serious offences. James  Clements, for instance, who had piked Lord O'Neill to 
death at the Battle of  Antrim, escaped by joining up, eventually fighting in the ranks 
ofthe 27th Regiment in the Netherlands during 1799.
31  Gilliam, alias Dignum, and 
Forrestal,  alias  Peck,  notorious  offenders  who  had murdered two  protestants, 
father and son, in Wexford in June 1798, eluded capture for many months by 
'having foisted themselves into the recruiting party of  Major F-and being active in 
enlisting men'. 
32  Others enlisted only to desert at an opportune moment. Three 
privates from the 89th, for instance, were executed in November 1798 for desertion 
and for joining the French forces of General Humbert. 
33 
As  the number of prisoners stabilized and transports began to take convicts 
to Botany Bay-three shiploads had left Ireland for Australia by the end of June 
1800-Cornwallis revised his rather undiscriminating policy of drafting all  able-
bodied rebels into the Army. He established a more sophisticated set of ground-
rules which aimed at ensuring that the more suitable punishment of  transportation 
was given to those prisoners who had been involved in murders, house robberies 
and other forms of  violent crime. The offences of  prisoners incarcerated in the large 
28  Cornwallis to Portland, 23 Aug.  1798, PRO, HO 100/73, fol.  376. Cornwallis' orders explain 
why he refused to confirm the sentence on Andrew Bryson, who had been ordered by a court martial 
in Sep. 1798 to join a regiment then stationed in Belfast. See Andrew Bryson's Ordeal: An Epilogue to 
the 1798 Rebellion, ed. Michael Durey (Cork, 1998), p. 9. 
29  See, for example, Cornwallis' decisions in PRO, HO 100/86, fols 57 (5 Aug.  1798), 59 (14 and 
17 Aug.  1798), 68-9 (27 Sep. 1798). 
3°  Carlow  in  '98.  The  Autobiography of William  Fan·ell of Carlow,  ed. Roger J.  McHugh (Dublin, 
1949), pp. 180-2. 
31  Dublin Evening Post, 3 May 1800. 
32 Freeman's Journal, 28 May 1799. 
33 ? to Dundas, 15 Nov. 1798, PRO, HO 100/86, fol.  86; Dublin Evening Post, 22 Nov. 1798. l 
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holding depots of New Geneva, near Waterford, and Cove  (Cobh)  were more 
carefully examined by the authorities. Not only were the elderly, the sick and the 
lame set aside for transportation, but those whose offences  were  deemed most 
heinous were rejected by the Army.
34 
Cornwallis embarked on this policy partly in response to continued complaints 
about the pernicious effects the redcoat rebels would have on the efficiency and 
morale of the Army. Portland's pre-rebellion opposition to drafting rebels into the 
Army was shared both by the government in London and by experienced army 
officers after the Rebellion, even though the pestilential West Indies was to be the 
rebels' destination. One Guards officer, viewing the prisoners held at New Geneva 
barracks, admitted that 'many of them are uncommon fine fellows', but thought 
that 'wherever we send them we send Emissaries'. He could think of  no worse place 
to send them than 'the smaller West India Islands'. 
35 
In London, acting on behalf of Henry Dundas, William Huskisson at the War 
Office sought to persuade the Duke of Portland to put pressure on Cornwallis to 
halt the practice. He confided to Under-Secretary John King: 'whether a Detach-
ment of Recruits of this Description affords any real Security to our reduced West 
India garrisons under any circumstances is  a matter of very serious Doubt; but 
under the present circumstances, I am convinced, it is equally injurious and alarm-
ing ...  If  the French had the sense', he continued, 'to send a body of good Troops 
and a sufficient naval Force there, we should, I am afraid, feel the consequences of 
misplaced Security.' Not only were the rebels unreliable soldiers, but their presence 
in the West Indies as a punishment would inevitably undermine the morale of the 
other troops, who had been 'taught to consider [their position] as honorable'.36 In 
response, King immediately wrote to the Irish government, 'humbly' stating 'that it 
is time to put an end to that mode of disembarrassing ourselves of the Irish rebels'. 
He claimed that a consideration of the composition of the army in the West Indies 
left him 'on the verge of alarm. Blacks, and the Whites composed chiefly of  prison-
ers and the worst of  His Majesty's subjects!' were together a frightening prospect.
37 
Although Cornwallis was sympathetic to these views, there was no viable alter-
native to drafting most of  the rebels into the Army. The best that could be done was 
to ensure that the worst elements were weeded out and that the remainder were 
sent as far away as  possible and kept in the Army for life. No alternative solution 
was ever found. As the war with revolutionary France drew to a ~lose in 1801, and 
the need for troops in the West Indies diminished, War Office opposition to the 
practice increased: 'the safety of  His Majesty's possessions in [the West Indies] will 
be endangered, as  certainly the Regiments they would be appointed to, will  be 
34 See, for example, the comments on the I<:.ing's  County prisoners tried by court martial in Nov. 
1798, NAI, RP 620/7/79/49; New Geneva Returns,  1 May 1801, PRO, HO 100/106, fols  40-6; 
Return of Prisoners on the Princess,  1 May 1801, PRO, HO 100/106, fols  47-50; Alexander Mars-
den to Edward Hatton, 17 June 1801, PRO, HO 100h06, fol.  37; 'Contents of Box, 26 October 
1801', NAI, RP 620/59/89. 
35 Extract of!etter from Waterford, 29 Aug. 1798, PRO, HO 100/78, fol.  321. 
36 Huskisson to King, 13 Nov. 1799, PRO, HO 32/2, fols 374-6. 
37 King to Littlehales, 14 Nov. 1799, PRO, HO 100/87, fol.  241. 
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contaminated.'
38  Nevertheless, another batch of prisoners was  sent to the West 
Indies as late as December 1801 and, despite widespread misgivings, a further large 
draft was sent following Emmet's Rebellion in 1803 and the renewal ofwar.
39 
III 
The scale of  the problem facing Cornwallis after the Rebellion has never been fully 
recognised  because  it  has  been  impossible  to  calculate  the  exact  number  of 
prisoners involved. The absence of regimental records from the West Indies and 
the burning of convict records in Dublin in 1922 have dramatically reduced the 
number of official papers, while  copies of most official prisoner returns sent to 
London also appear not to have survived. However, from scattered information it is 
possible to state that between 1799 and 1804 five  large drafts of rebel prisoners 
were sent directly to the West Indies from Ireland, comprising more than 2400 
individuals. In addition, possibly as many as another 800 rebels eventually reached 
the West Indies, after first being sent to Chatham, the main army depot in Britain. 
Altogether, including prisoners 'encouraged' to volunteer for the Army; those sent 
to Prussia and Botany Bay; those permitted to banish themselves (more than 300); 
and those eventually released, at one time or another the Irish government must 
have had in custody as many as  6000 rebels. Those sent to the West Indies thus 
comprised more than one-half of  the total. 
The first draft was collected following a sudden order from Cornwallis that all 
rebels currently held in prisons in different parts of the country should be trans-
mitted as  quickly as  possible to New Geneva.
40  The urgency resulted from the 
tactics used by defence counsel at the trial ofTheobold Wolfe Tone in November 
1798. Although Tone, having already pleaded guilty to a charge of high treason, 
was dying from a self-inflicted wound to his throat, his lawyer John Philpot Curran 
challenged the right of a military court to try prisoners while the civil courts were 
still sitting and called for a writ of  habeas corpus.
41 The issue remained unresolved 
at the time, but legal opinion was divided and the prospect arose of hundreds of 
cases previously tried by courts martial having to be reopened if prisoners suc-
cessfully obtained writs ofhabeas corpus from the civil courtsY Cornwallis thought 
it prudent to place the prisoners out of  reach of the courts as swiftly as possible. 
38 Col. Robert Brownrigg to E. F. Hatton, 8 May 1801, PRO, HO 50/389. 
39 Brownrigg to J.  Sullivan,  17 Nov.  1801, PRO, WO  1/623, fol.  611; Hardwicke to  Charles 
Yorke, 7  Sep.  1803, PRO, HO 100/117, fol.  157; Duke of York to Charles Yorke, 24 Oct.  1803, 
Yorke to Hardwicke, 25 Oct.  1803, Hardwicke Papers, BL, Add. MS. 35770, fols  68-9; Duke of 
York  to  Charles  Yorke,  14  Mar.  1804,  Yorke  to  Duke  of York,  15  Mar.  1804,  NAI,  RP 
620/13/174/13; List of convicts at Cork, c.  15 June 1804, NAI, Prisoners' Petitions and Cases [PPC], 
no. 1174. 
40 H. Taylor to Maj-Gen. French, 21  Nov.  1798, [Edward Cooke?]  to Brig-Gen. Campbell, 23 
Dec. 1798, PRO, HO 100/86, fols 44, 100. 
41  The Dublin Journal,  10 Nov.  1798; Marianne Elliott,  Wolfe  Tone:  Prophet of Irish  Independence 
(New Haven, 1989), p. 398. 
42 Edward Cooke to Wickham, 12 Nov.  1798, PRO, HO 100/70, fol.  98; Castlereagh to Wick-
ham, 16 Nov. 1798, in Memoirs and Correspondence  of Viscount Castlereagh,  ed. Charles Vane, Mar-
quis of Londonderry (London, 1848), i, 445-7. 304  ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
The first draft to the West Indies was taken from this concentration of prison-
ers at New Geneva. About twenty-five per cent came from Ulster, probably the 
largest group sent from that province.
43 A number complained that they had never 
been brought to trial, but most had been sentenced for involvement in the Rebel-
lion in Antrim and Down.
44  On 26 February 1799 the rebel soldiers embarked on 
the Admiral de  Vries,  a sixty-eight gun third-rate ship of the line captured from the 
Dutch in 1797, and they set sail on 9 March. With them as a guard were more than 
300 German troops of the 5th Battalion, 60th Regiment. 
45 They arrived in Martin-
ique on 9 April. At least three prisoners died of fever on the voyage, leaving 377 to 
be distributed through the regiments in Martinique and Jamaica. 
46 
The second draft, collected at New Geneva and Cove following the despatch of 
350 troops to Prussia in September, was ready for embarkation by November 1799. 
According to William Huskisson, 'Nearly the whole of  this Batch appears to consist 
of notorious rebels, sentenced to serve the King abroad or to some more severe 
punishment commuted to that Condition.' Reports from Ireland emphasized their 
unruliness: 'the Lord Lieutenant appears to have little Doubt they would carry the 
Ships into France, unless a proper military guard is  placed over them.  '
47  On this 
occasion, instead of a Navy troopship being provided, three private vessels were 
chartered by the Transport Board, with sufficient space to include the regular 
troops necessary for  'this unpleasant Service'. The three ships, Hibernia,  Brothers 
and Actives Increase,  were meant to join a West Indies convoy which left Cork in 
early December, but were held up when General Johnson, Commanding Officer at 
New Geneva, detained them because of overcrowding. The transports, Johnson 
informed Dundas,  were  so  unsuitable  that  'he  is  persuaded  one  half of [the 
prisoners] at least will die in the voyage'.
48 Predictably, men had to be relanded at 
Waterford after falling sick on board.
49 Later in the month the Hibernia, capable of 
defending itself with sixteen  6-pound cannon and a  large  military  guard,  was 
allowed to sail for the West Indies alone.  5° After improvements were made to their 
accommodation  facilities,  including the  erection  of bulkheads  to  separate  the 
convicts from the guards, the Brothers and Actives Increase sailed with a convoy from 
Cove on 15 January 1800, arriving at Martinique on 26 March.  5
1 
43 There were enough Ulstermen in New Geneva for a 'Belfast barrack' to be set up. Durey (ed.), 
Bryson's Ordeal, p. 59. The draft sent to Prussia a few months later also included large numbers from 
Ulster, mainly victims of  the Insurrection Act. 
44 Samuel Neilson to Castlereagh, 11  Oct.  1798, [Hugh]  Adrian to Neilson, 7 Oct. 1798, NAI, 
State Prisoners' Petitions [SPP], no. 245. 
45 Cornwallis to Portland, 15 Mar. 1799, PRO, HO 100/83. 
46 Lt-Gen. Trigg to Dundas, 24 Apr. 1799, PRO, WO 1/87, pp. 197-9, 201. 
47 Huskisson to King, 13 Nov. 1799, PRO, HO 30/2, fol.  374. 
48 Johnson to Dundas, 28 Nov. 1799, PRO, ADM 108/65, fol. 70. 
49 Lt Flinn to Transport Board, 3 Dec. 1799, PRO, ADM 108/65, fol.  69. 
50 Transport Board Minutes, 13, 21  Dec. 1799, PRO, ADM 108/65, fols 77, 94. 
51  Transport Board Minutes, 4 Feb. 1800, PRO, ADM 108/66, fol.  209; Transport Commission-
ers to Dundas, 21  Apr. 1800, PRO, ADM 108/20, p. 39; Lt Whitaker to Transport Board, 24 June 
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The numbers in this draft cannot accurately be ascertained, although the two 
ships which sailed with the convoy were officially reported to have landed 279 
rebels in Martinique. 
52 Hibernia had beds for 250 troops;
53  at least that number of 
rebels were ready for embarkation. But sixty-four were transferred to the Ancient 
Loyal Irish Fencibles at Cove. This was a corps, 'principally formed of  persons who 
were generally suspected of  disaff~ction', raised by Thomas Judkin Fitzgerald, the 
notorious Sheriff of Tipperary. It was subsequently sent to Minorca and Egypt.  5
4 
Taking this transaction and the sickness  at New Geneva into account, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the Hibernia eventually carried 150 rebels and about 100 
guards and their followers to the West Indies. The second draft thus comprised 429 
unwilling recruits. 
The third draft of  rebels was the largest ever sent to the West Indies. As early as 
April1800, 420 rebel recruits were ready for transportation; following the summer 
assizes and continuing courts martial, the number had risen to 781, with more still 
expected. 
55  On this  occasion, with space on the transports at a premium, large 
detachments of regular troops did not accompany the rebel recruits. Instead, the 
regulations applying to ships carrying convicts to Botany Bay were implemented, 
with the ships' contractors supplying the guards.
56 Presumably, also, the practice of 
putting prisoners in irons was followed. 
The third draft sailed to the West Indies towards the end of 1800 and was 
followed a year later by the last batch sent before the end of the Revolutionary 
Wars. By this time the Pitt ministry had fallen and Cornwallis had resigned as Lord 
Lieutenant, to negotiate what became the Treaty of Amiens. The flow of  prisoners 
had substantially subsided and the system of transporting convicts to New South 
Wales greatly streamlined.  5
7 With peace imminent, the need for troops in the West 
Indies diminished. Under the new Lord Lieutenant, the Earl of Hardwicke, the 
Irish government began to wind up its prisoner operations. The unfit and elderly 
were discharged from New Geneva; others, 'whose Crimes not being of  magnitude, 
and incapable of a voyage to Botany Bay', were offered bail. This policy, however, 
was kept secret until one final batch of  327 rebel recruits ordered to the West Indies 
embarked on four  navy  transports,  Thelia,  Majestic,  Champion  and  Warrior,  in 
52 Trigg to War Office,  11  Apr.  1800, PRO, CO 319/6, fol.  118. Actives Increase  embarked 204 
people at Cove in Dec., 121 of whom were convicts, 53 guards, and the rest family members of the 
troops. Transport Board Minutes, 21  Dec. 1799, PRO, ADM 108/65, fol.  94. Brothers had room for 
246 people. 
53 Transport Board Minutes, 28 Mar. 1800, PRO, ADM 108/66, fol.  333. 
54 Hardwicke to Pelham, 25 May 1802, PRO, HO 100/109, fol.  124; Transport Board Minutes, 
21  Dec. 1799, PRO, ADM 108/65, fol.  94; NAI, PPC, nos 438, 566; Chart, 'Irish Levies', p. 510; 
William J.  Hayes, Tipperary in the  Year of  Rebellion 1798 (Roscrea, 1998), p. 43; Dublin Evening Post, 
19Nov.1799. 
55 Transport Commissioners to Dundas, 21  Apr. 1800, PRO, ADM 108/20, p. 39; J. Flinn to Lit-
tlehales, 26 Sep. 1800, PRO, WO 1/800, fol.  573. 
56 Littlehales to Flynn (sic),  1 Oct. 1800, PRO, WO 1/800, fol.  577; Charles Bateson, The Convict 
Ships 1787-1868 (Glasgow, 1985), p. 26. 
57 According to available records, only 94 individuals were court-martialled in 1801, compared 
with 1140 in the second half of 1798, 690 in 1799 and 151 in 1800. 306  ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
November 1801, lest 'they should have made or feigned Sores and Indispositions 
to prevent their Sailing,  and thereby procuring their Discharges'.
58  This group 
included deserters and a number of prisoners sentenced to transportation whose 
'extreme youth or other circumstances' made them suitable army recruits.  5
9 'About 
150 of  the most Desperate Fellows' that even the experienced General Johnson had 
seen remained bound for Botany Bay.
60 
These four drafts of prisoners sent directly from Ireland to the West Indies 
during the French Revolutionary Wars were augmented by an indeterminate num-
ber of rebel recruits who arrived at the same destination via more circuitous routes. 
Undoubtedly, a large proportion ofthe 800 troops who arrived in the West Indies 
from Gibraltar in September 1799, to be drafted into the desertion-stricken 2nd 
Battalion of the 60th Regiment, were Irish. Only a few months before in Gibraltar 
'a wicked plot' had been discovered among soldiers  in the 18th Regiment, the 
object of which was to murder the officers and loyal troops before handing the 
garrison over to the enemy. The organisers were said to be rebels who had sur-
rendered after  the  Battle  of Vinegar  Hill  in  1798  and who  had been sent to 
Gibraltar to fill the ranks of the 18th. 
61  Furthermore, rebel Irish 'volunteers' were 
on at least two occasions included in drafts of 'culprits' and deserters sent to the 
West Indies from England.  62 In December 1799 one draft of 220 accompanied the 
11th Regiment to the West Indies, where they were distributed among the various 
islands as on previous occasions.63 In August 1801 nearly 300 deserters sailed from 
Gravesend to the West Indies. 'Many of these fine fellows', it was reported, 'were 
from Ireland, and had been, they said, deluded from their duty and allegiance by 
the rebellious, particularly in the province ofLeinster.'
64 
Finally,  despite  the  continued  lack  of enthusiasm  shown  by  the  military 
authorities for enlisting rebels, in the aftermath of Robert Emmet's Rebellion of 
1803 yet another large draft was sent to the West Indies. The 23 July uprising in 
Dublin had caught the Irish government napping. In the aftermath, smarting at 
loyalist accusations that many of the rebels had previously been beneficiaries of 
Cornwallis' policy of leniency in 1798, the authorities rounded up hundreds of 
suspects. The small group of leaders were executed or transported; the rest, thought 
Hardwicke, were too dangerous to be left in the country but 'would probably be 
58 NAI, RP 620/59/89; Transport Office to Lord Hobart,  13 Nov.  1801, PRO, WO 1/801, fol. 
125; Johnson to Charles Abbot, 10 Jan. 1802, NAI, RP 620/62/76. 
59 Brownrigg to J.  Sullivan,  17  Nov.  1801, PRO, WO  1/623, fol.  611; Alexander Marsden to 
Edward Hatton, 17 June 1801, PRO, HO 100/106, fol.  37; Abbot to Sir George Shee, 2 Oct. 1801, 
PRO, HO 100/107, fol.  92. 
60 Johnson to Brownrigg, 2 May 1801, PRO, HO 50/389. 
61  [Philadelphia] Aurora, 2 Aug. 1799; Trigge to War Office, 10 May 1799, PRO, CO 319/6, fol. 
99; Trigge to Dundas, 17 Sep. 1799, PRO, WO 1/87, P:. 536. 
62 That 'culprits' in English military parlance referred primarily to Irish rebels is confirmed by Lt-
Gen. Grinfield to Brownrigg, 13 Oct. 1802, PRO, WO 1/96. 
63 Transport Board Minutes, 6 and 27 Dec. 1799, PRO, ADM 108/65, fols 56, 107; 24 July 1800, 
PRO, ADM 108/67, fol. 223. 
64  [Dublin] Freeman's Journal, 13 Aug. 1801. WHITE SLAVES  307 
induced to enlist to avoid a prosecution'.
65 In London, memories of  the post-1798 
period remained strong and the Duke of  York initially rejected the proposal. 
66 But, 
as  in previous years, no alternative solution could be found. By March 1804 500 
prisoners were ready to be sent to the West Indies, a number which was augmented 
a few months later by the overspi,ll from the convict ship Tellicherry. 
67 
IV 
The rebel prisoners were unwilling recruits, 'white slaves' in the opinion of 
William Duane, the Irish-American radical. 
68 The prospect of  a journey to the West 
Indies in the 1790s evoked fear and consternation everywhere. 'We are bound to 
Grave's End' was one example of the black humour of sailors leaving the London 
docks,  bound for  the  Caribbean.
69  In April  1799  two  Irish  militia  regiments, 
ordered to Jersey, refused to board transports, fearing that they would be sent to the 
West Indies.
70  The resurrection of the British Army from 1800 became possible 
only after the War Office, by offering special terms of enlistment to soldiers pre-
pared to transfer from the militia to line regiments, had eliminated the bogey of  the 
West Indies. No new recruit would be ordered to theatres of  war outside Europe.
71 
For some of the rebel prisoners, however, the issue was not so clear cut. Those 
whose capital sentences were reduced to general service, for instance, would have 
seen the West Indies option as offering at least a chance of survival. Nor can it be 
assumed that transportation to New South Wales was widely viewed as preferable 
to general service, especially as  many of the commuted rebels believed that their 
terms of service would end when peace arrived.
72  As Lieutenant-Colonel Donkin 
of the 11th Regiment explained in April 1802: 'I have some reason to apprehend 
that the term "Commuted Punishment" has  occasionally been but imperfectly 
explained to the men making the commutation', for many came 'under an idea that 
they would be attached to some Regiment serving here and follow its fortunes, 
without any conception that their banishment was to be perpetual.  m 
The rebel recruits' nonetheless understandable reluctance to be shipped to the 
West Indies graveyard merely compounded the Army's genuine fears  that they 
65 Hardwicke to Yorke, 7 Sep. 1803, PRO, HO 100/107, fol.  157. 
66 Duke of York to Charles Yorke, 24 Oct.  1803, Yorke to Hardwicke, 25 Oct.  1803, BL, Add. 
MS. 35770, fols 68-9. 
67 Duke of York to  Yorke,  14 Mar.  1804, Yorke to Duke of York,  15  Mar.  1804, NAI,  RP 
620/13/174/13; Names of State Prisoners in Kilmainham and Newgate ordered to enlist 1804, NAI, 
RP 620/13/173/1 and 3; NAI, PPC, no.  1174; Nepean to King, 18 Sep. 1804, PRO, HO 100/123, 
fol.  305. 
68 Aurora, 23 Dec. 1806. 
69  [Philadelphia] Daily Advertiser, 27 Apr. 1797. 
7°  Cornwallis to Dundas, 11  Apr.  1799, PRO, WO 1/612, fol.  67. Their fears were allayed a few 
days later. 
71  Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, p. 319. 
72 It is  abundantly clear from prisoners' petitions to the government that general service was pre-
ferable to transportation. 
73 Lt-Col. R.  Donkin to Brig-Gen. Maitland, 29 Apr.  1802, PRO, WO  1/95, fols  85-6. Rebel 
volunteers drafted into the 30th and 89th Regiments thought the same: Hardwicke to Pelham, 11 
and 12 May 1802, PRO, HO 100/108, fols  127-8. 308  ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
posed a  distinct threat to discipline and good order.  Once the rebels had been 
attested, of course, they became subject to the Mutiny Act and its attendant dis-
cipline. Nevertheless, fearing their contagious influence, the authorities kept them 
in barracks at New Geneva separated from the volunteer recruits. In most other 
respects,  however,  apart from  being ineligible  for  the usual enlistment bounty, 
being forced to have haircuts ('the Greatest number that were there ...  never had 
their hair cut in their life'), and being guarded around the clock, the rebel recruits 
received treatment similar to other recruits. 
74 New Geneva itself has had a notor-
ious reputation. Richard Madden, self-appointed hagiographer of the United Irish-
men, described it as 'a monster prison'. 'The atrocious cruelties inflicted on the state 
prisoners (sic)  confined in this stronghold are scarcely credible.ns Thomas Cloney, 
a  prominent  United  Irishman  persecuted  by  loyalists  but  the  recipient  of 
remarkably lenient treatment from the government, called it 'a most damp and 
loathsome prison. It really exceeded any description I could give of it for filthiness 
and a want of every sort of comfort.'
76 The reality, however, although harsh, was a 
reflection of normal army life in this era. Andrew Bryson, the young Presbyterian 
United Irishman, in his private narrative to his sister described life  in the camp 
quite  differently.  The prisoners  ate  meat and vegetables  daily;  they were  paid 
sixpence a day; there was a canteen with beer; and they appeared free to wander 
their compound during daylight. 'We lived much better in Geneva than we did on 
our march' from Belfast, was his comment. 
77 
New Geneva was,  nevertheless, for the rebels a prison camp, not a holiday 
camp, and conditions for those prisoners on the floating  tenders at Cove were 
considerably worse.  Discipline was  harsh and floggings  frequent.  One hundred 
lashes were usually inflicted for escape attempts. Many breakouts were successful, 
leading to gangs of robbers roaming the Waterford region.  'Certain it is', com-
plained one local, 'that any of them that are Supplyed with money can get out.'
78 
Bryson himself  was involved in one attempted mass escape which collapsed when a 
bribed sentry informed his superior officers. Three prisoners were killed and two 
wounded in the attempt. 
79 
Official fears  of prisoners mutinying while en  route  to the West Indies were 
reflected in the large numbers of regular troops accompanying all but the third 
draft.  Seamen on the transports, following the mutinies of 1797, also  remained 
suspect, possibly with good reason. John Wright, commander of the Admiral de 
Vries,  had alarmed the Transport Board when he informed them of the mutinous 
behaviour ofhis crew on the way to Ireland in January 1799. He blamed 'some very 
bad men who had been delegates in the Fleet' in 1797. Although Wright put the 
74 Lewis to Johnson, 15 Sep. 1798, PRO, WO 4/339, fol.  314; NAI, PPC, no. 287; Durey (ed.), 
Bryson's Ordeal, p. 65.  , 
75 R. R. Madden, The United Irishmen (Dublin, 1846), i, 330-1. 
76 Thomas Cloney, A  Personal Narrative of . .. 1798 (Dublin, 1832), p. 131. 
77 Durey (ed.), Bryson's Ordeal, pp. 59-60. 
78  Patrick Dean to Marsden, 24 Apr. 1800, NAI, RP 620/58/61. 
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troublemakers ashore before touching Ireland, Lieutenant-Colonel de Rottenburg, 
commander of the 5/60th, nevertheless asked for a 'chosen crew' without 'a single 
United Irishman amongst them', a request impossible to comply with.  80 
More serious was the mutiny in December 1801 on board one of  the transports 
anchored at Passage, the port for New Geneva, carrying ninety of the rebel prison-
ers,  when orders came to sail  for the West Indies. According to one crewman, 
William Whitfield, '20 of us Bold Seamen' with handspikes were faced down by a 
superior number of soldiers with fixed bayonets. 'If  it had not been for the Guard 
ship and the Commodore', he went on, the prisoners 'certainly would have helped 
us.'
81  The government tried to hush up this mutiny, and another which broke out 
on the warships  Temeraire  and Formidable  in Bantry Bay at the same time, by 
intercepting crewmen's letters at the post office in London.
82 
Once the rebels were in the West Indies, the Army command sought to reduce 
their potential for disorder by distributing them around the islands in every regi-
ment.  The  commander  of the  disease-ravaged  43rd  Regiment  in  Martinique 
applied for fifty recruits from Bryson's draft, but was  allowed only thirty-four. 
83 
Sixty sailed with the Admiral de  Vries  to Jamaica; the rest were  divided among 
regiments on the island. 
84 Subsequent drafts were treated in a similar manner. 
85 Not 
until after the renewal of  war in 1803 were specific penal battalions established. 
86 
The rebel recruits brought with them an unsavoury reputation which many did 
their best to live up to. Shocking accounts of their behaviour in Jamaica followed 
the arrival of the first draft. According to the sister of one clergyman: 'As soon as 
they got arms into their hands, they deserted, and fled into the mountains, where 
they have been joined by large bodies of  the natives and such of  the French as were 
in the island. '
87 Several skirmishes between these bands and military search parties 
caused casualties on both sides. Later drafts had such a bad reputation for indis-
cipline that captains of  private merchant ships refused to transport them from one 
island to another. 
88 Fears for the safety of  property in the West Indies were aired, as 
increasing numbers  of Irish rebels  threatened to  contaminate the regiments to 
which they were attached. 
89 
The Irish rebels' determination to struggle against their unenviable situation 
ultimately succumbed to  the twin pressures  of military  discipline  and tropical 
diseases.  Bryson's harrowing account of his experiences on Martinique-he and 
80 Transport Office to Nepean, 11  Mar. 1799, PRO, WO 1/693, fol.  155. 
81  W. W[hitfield] to Thomas Whitfield, 11 Dec. 1801, PRO, HO 100/100, fol.  219. 
82 PRO, HO 100/104, fols 235-45. These ships were part of the same proposed convoy. 
83 Durey (ed.), Bryson's Ordeal, p. 81. 
84 Trigge to Dundas, 24 Apr. 1799, PRO, WO 1/87, p. 201. 
85 Trigge to War Office, 11 Apr. 1800, PRO, CO 319/6, fol.  118. 
86 R.  L.  Yaple,  'The Auxiliaries:  Foreign  and Miscellaneous  Regiments  in the British  Army 
1802-1817', JSAHR 50 (1972), 27. It is  possible that recruits sent after Emmet's Rebellion served 
in these penal battalions. 
87 Castlereagh Memoirs, ii, 417. 
88  [War Office] to William Huskisson, 10 Apr. 1800, PRO, WO 1/621, fol.  331. 
89 Robert Brownrigg to E. F. Hutton, 8 May 1801, PRO, HO 50/389. 310  ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
many of  his companions fell sick within days of arrival-shows how, irrespective of 
their backgrounds, all white men in the Caribbean had to undergo a  period of 
seasoning. Suffering episodes of delerium in a military hospital 'going to ruin'  ,90 
Bryson watched many of his friends die one by one. He was fortunate; he survived 
but required a long period of  recuperation before he was strong enough to escape to 
America, following in the footsteps  of some of his fellow  rebels.  Although it is 
doubtful whether many of  his companions made a contribution to the war effort in 
the West Indies, later drafts may have been more useful. Their dispersal into every 
available regiment ensured that some played a role in the minor operations which 
took place in the Caribbean after 1799.
91  Much of their time, however, was taken 
up with garrison duties and guarding prisoners of war, menial tasks suitable for 
untrained and disease-ravaged troops.92 
v 
Ironically, Cornwallis' successful conclusion of peace negotiations at Amiens 
brought the issue of  the rebel prisoners once again to the fore. What was to be done 
with them? Most of the West Indian islands  gained during the war had to be 
returned to their former owners. The Army could return to its peacetime estab-
lishment, a desire always at the forefront of government minds. Yet, contrary to 
what the rebels may have expected, the terms of  their commutations required them 
to suffer life  banishment in the Army.  Despite the dangers of the West Indies 
station, there still remained in October 1802 1290 'Convicts, Culprits, Deserters 
etc ...  who have been sent out since the beginning of the Year 1799 to serve in the 
West Indies for life'. 
93  Although some of these survivors must have been English, 
the vast majority were Irish. From these data it appears that between 1799 and 
1802  about one-third of the rebels  had either died or escaped.  This was  less 
than the death rate suffered by the Army during the Revolutionary War in this 
theatre, but was higher than the average for the Army as a whole during these four 
years.
94 
As each regiment set sail for home and demobilisation, the rebel soldiers were 
transferred to the forces still remaining. The 37th Regiment, for example, received 
91  'culprits' from the 53rd in June 1802 and another 98 from the 14th in 1803.
95 
The 2/60th, having discarded its lifers, returned home in 1803 with a strength of 
just forty-seven men.
96  The only returns available, for October 1802, show that 
90 Trigge to Dundas, 14 May 1799, PRO, WO 1/87, p. 213. 
91  Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, pp. 317-25. 
92 Durey (ed.), Bryson's Ordeal, passim; Trigge to Dundas, 10 Oct. 1799, PRO, WO 1/87, p. 569. 
93 Lt-Gen. Grinfield to Brownrigg, 13 Oct. 1801, PRO, WO 1/96. In addition, three to four hun-
dred deserters who had been allocated to specific regiments before leaving Britain were also  still 
alive. 
94 Duffy, Soldiers,  Sugar and Seapower, p. 366. 
95  C. T. Atkinson, History of  the 37th Regiment 1702-1913 (London, 1913), i,  263. I am grateful to 
Lt-Col. C. D. Darroch for this reference. 
96 Evan Nepean to Lt-Col. Clinton, 15 Aug. 1803, Nepean Papers, National Maritime Museum, 
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rebels were serving in eleven regiments, in some, for example the 1/1st, the 37th, 
the 64th and the 57th, in very large numbers.
97 Such concentrations were obviously 
of some concern for the military authorities, as were the costs involved in keeping 
men who were becoming increasingly decrepit. General Grinfield, who was himself 
to die from fever in 1804, was se.eking a new policy when he pointed out to the 
Horse Guards that many of  the culprits were 'unfit for, and useless as, Soldiers'. He 
could not return them to England with the other sick soldiers, yet humanitarian 
feelings prevented him from 'turning them adrift without provision or Subsistence'. 
They were a drain on government money and a burden on the regiments, 'as they 
must be provided with room in Barracks, when tolerably well,  and in Hospital, 
when sick'.  98  · 
Interestingly,  Grinfield reiterated the claim by Lieutenant-Colonel Donkin, 
endorsed by General Trigge, that many of  the Irish rebels had 'behaved themselves 
well,  both as  men,  and  Soldiers'.  Donkin had pointed out that the  'culprits' 
comprised two distinct groups: those 'sent out hither for the most atrocious crimes 
and [who]  still persevere in their villanies'; and those 'sent out for a simple fault of 
which they repent, and attempt by an attentive discharge of  their duties to atone for 
their former misconduct'. 
99  Among the latter were  nearly thirty who had been 
promoted to non-commissioned rank and whose regiments wished to retain their 
services when they left the West Indies. Under current regulations, this was impos-
sible. 
The suggestion by senior officers in the West Indies that some incentive ought 
to be offered to the former rebels was taken up during the months of peace by the 
Duke of York at the Horse Guards, resulting in new orders being issued in April 
1803.  Henceforward,  soldiers  under commutation of sentence sent abroad on 
general service were no longer to be deemed 'culprits', but 'Soldiers destined to 
continue on Foreign Service'. After seven years, if they could obtain a certificate of 
satisfactory  service  from  their commanding officers,  they would be allowed to 
return home with their regiments, having 'fully expiated' their former offences. The 
only exceptions were those who had been sentenced by general court martial to 
serve abroad longer than seven years; they would need to petition the King person-
ally. loa 
These orders were viewed by the Commander-in-Chief as  'a powerful Incite-
ment to Reformation and Good Behaviour', but in practice they had no immediate 
effect. None ofthe Irish rebels had been in the West Indies for seven years when the 
orders were issued, and the renewal of war at the same moment ensured that they 
remained in place in their regiments. However, it is  possible that survivors may 
have moved with their regiments in later years. The 37th returned to England in 
97 223, 205,  173 and 150 respectively.  Grinfield to Brownrigg,  13  Oct.  1802, PRO, WO 1/96. 
The 57th returned to England in 1803, presumably having already transferred its culprits into other 
formations. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid; Trigge to Brownrigg, 24 May 1802, PRO, WO 1/95, fol.  83; Donkin to Maitland, 29 Apr. 
1802, PRO, WO 1/95, fols 85-6. 
100 Horse Guards to Grinfield, 18 Apr. 1803, PRO, WO 3/36, fols  14-15. 312  ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
1809, for instance, and the 64th went to Canada in 1813.
101 The numbers involved 
would have been tiny. Most rebel prisoners must have left their bones bleaching on 
the picturesque but deadly islands of the West Indies. 
101  Ray Westlake, English  and Welsh  Infantry Regiments. An Illustrated Record of Service  1662-1994 
(Staplehurst, 1995), pp. 120, 200. 
• 